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NASA Risk and Safety Culture:  
Minimizing the Risk of Catastrophe by Bringing the Lessons of Space Home 
 
NASA is challenged with integrating cutting-edge risk management practices and techniques throughout 
a large organization with an extraordinarily diverse mission. This presentation details how past mission 
and institutional failures helped NASA establish a safety culture and a uniform risk management 
environment. This presentation will also explore: 
 How the loss prevention industry has influenced NASA’s approach to sustaining its unique, yet 
aging, infrastructure.  
 How the lessons learned at NASA can augment and enhance the strong operational risk 
management capabilities that already exist within hazardous industries.  
 How NASA’s safety capabilities have been specifically developed to minimize the risk of loss of 
life and loss of mission 
 Moving beyond the use of historical data - specifically:  
o Proactive and predictive: designed to give you the information you need when you need 
it, not when it’s too late.  
o Designed to flag warnings early: Before catastrophic events occur.  
o Demonstrated: These capabilities have been used at NASA for years. 
 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20170001653 2019-08-31T17:25:35+00:00Z
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2“It can only be attributable to human error.“
-- HAL 9000 (2001: A Space Odyssey)
Words of Wisdom
February 8, 2017 David T. Loyd
NASA Risk and Safety Culture
• NASA’s Losses in Space and on the Ground 
– Failure is not an option we choose, but it is a reality we must face….
• The Impact of Human Factors on Mishaps
• Human Error Integrated in Risk Assessment
– Acknowledging human frailty and modeling error probabilities.
• NASA’s Safety Culture – Minimizing the Risk 
Environment
– Reducing error by cultivating skill-based behavior.
– Bolstering trust throughout operations.
– Measuring safety culture growth.
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4Recent Mission Mishaps
NASA’s Losses
Columbia STS-107, February 1, 2003:
• 7 fatalities; 
• $3 Billion vehicle loss;
• 2.5 year mission impact. 
NOAA N-Prime, 
September 6, 
2003:
• $135 Million 
vehicle damage;
• 5.5 year mission 
impact. 
Genesis,  September 8, 2004:
• Some sample retrieval materials lost.
DART, April 16, 2005:
• Proximity operations 
mission objectives 
lost. 
OCO, February  24, 2009:
• $280 Million vehicle loss;
• 5+ year mission impact. 
Glory,  March 4, 
2011:
• $424 Million 
vehicle loss;
• ??? mission 
impact. 
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5NASA’s Losses
MSFC Freedom Star Tow-wire Injury, December 12, 2006
• Hospitalization due to internal injuries from impact with SRB 
tow-wire.
Location Where Deceased 
Fell From Roof
Second Point of 
Impact of Deceased
First Point of Impact 
of Deceased
KSC Roofing Fatality, 
March 17, 2006
• Subcontractor died 
from head injuries 
suffered due to fall.
JSC Chamber B 
Asphyxiation, 
July 28, 2010
• Shoulder 
injury due to 
asphyxiation 
and fall.
WFF CNC Injury, 
October 28, 2010
• Sub-dermal 
tissue damage 
due to impact 
from machine 
tool shrapnel.
Recent Institutional Mishaps
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What is the impact of Human Factors?
• Estimates range from 65-90% of catastrophic mishaps are due 
to human error.
– NASA’s human factors-related mishaps causes are estimated at ~75%
• As much as we’d like to error-proof our work environment, 
even the most automated and complex technical endeavors 
require human interaction…and are vulnerable to human 
frailty.
• Industry and government are focusing not only on human 
factors integration into hazardous work environments, but 
also looking for practical approaches to cultivating a strong 
Safety Culture that diminishes risk.   
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Some Risk Measurement Philosophy…
As much as we’d like to be able to predict error, the reality is that we must 
measure known performance characteristics to identify vulnerabilities, 
mitigate greatest risk, and enable prudent response to the next accident.
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High Risk Occupations vs. Space Flight
Shuttle Astronaut
Northeast Multispecies 
Groundfish Fishing
Alaskan Commercial Fishing
Commercial Fishing
Extraction –
Mining, Oil and Gas
Construction Worker
Alaskan Commuter Pilot
Airline Pilot
Timber Cutting and Logging
Truck Driver
0 1:100 1:50 1:33
Probability
1:218
1:166
1:775
1:851
1:4420
1:4190
1:336
1:1270
1:998
1:3790
Person-Fatality Risk Per Year 
Risk increases as “drill down” into smaller and 
smaller groups that drive the risk.  
Shuttle Astronaut risk is a very small group that 
has high risk.
Miner risk does not include fatalities due to chronic 
illnesses like “black lung.” 
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9Risk Informed Decision-Making 
(RIDM)* involves: 
(1) Identification of decision alternatives, 
recognizing opportunities where they 
arise, and considering a sufficient 
number and diversity of performance 
measures to constitute a 
comprehensive set for decision-making 
purposes.
(2) Risk analysis of decision alternatives 
to support ranking.
(3) Selection of a decision alternative 
informed by (not solely based on) risk 
analysis results.
NASA’s Risk Assessment Concepts & Requirements
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* NPR 8000.4, Agency Risk Management Procedural Requirements 
JSC RISK MATRIX
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High – Mitigate; implement new 
processes, change requirements, 
or re-baseline
Moderate – Manage/consider 
alternative processes, or Accept
Low – Manage within normal 
processes; or Close
SEVERITY
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LIKELIHOOD RATING
4
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1
Very 
Likely
Likely
Unlikely
Possible
Highly 
Unlikely
Expected to happen.  Controls have minimal to no effect.
Likely to happen.  Controls have significant limitations or 
uncertainties.
Could happen.  Controls exist, with some limitations or 
uncertainties.
Not expected to happen.  Controls have minor limitations 
or uncertainties.
Extremely remote possibility that it will happen. Strong 
controls in place.
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CONSEQUENCE Subcategories 1 2 3 4 5
Personnel
Minor injury;                           
Minor OSHA violation
Short-term injury; Moderate 
OSHA violation
Long-term injury, impairment 
or incapacitation;           
Signif icant OSHA violation
Permanent injury or 
incapacitation;                             
Major OSHA violation
Loss of life
System, Facility Minor damage to asset
Moderate impact or 
degraded performance
Loss of non-critical asset Damage to a critical asset
Loss of critical asset or 
emergency evacuation
Environment
Minor or non-reportable 
hazard or incident
Moderate hazard or 
reportable violation
Signif icant violation; Event 
requires immediate 
remediation
Major violation; Event causes 
temporary w ork stoppage
Catastrophic hazard
TECHNICAL Performance
Minor impact to mission 
objectives or 
requirements
Incomplete compliance w ith 
a key mission objective
Noncompliance; Signif icant 
impact to mission
Noncompliance; Major impact 
on Center or Spaceflight 
mission
Failure to meet mission 
objectives
Infrastructure
Minor impact or reduced 
effectiveness 
Moderate impact or damage 
to infrastructure
Signif icant damage to 
infrastructure or reduced 
support
Mission delays or major 
impacts to Center operations
Extended loss of critical 
capabilities
Workforce
Minor impact to human 
capital
Moderate impact to human 
capital
Signif icant impact; Loss of 
critical skill
Major impact; Loss of skill set Loss of Core Competency
COST
Organizational or 
CMO Impact
<2% Budget increase or 
<$1M CMO Threat
2-5% Budget increase or   
$1M-$5M CMO Threat
5-10% Budget increase or   
$5M-10M CMO Threat
10-15% Budget increase or 
$10M-$60M CMO Threat
>15% Budget increase or 
>$60M CMO Threat; 
SCHEDULE -- Minor milestone slip
Moderate milestone slip; 
Schedule margin available
Project milestone slip; No 
impact to a critical path
Major milestone slip; Impact to 
a critical path
Failure to meet critical 
milestones
HSE                              
(Health, Safety, 
Environment)
CENTER 
CAPABILITIES
Risk Scorecard
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Institutional Risk Management
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3 x 4 p Test system maintenance ## 3 2 2 4 4 2
4 x 5 p Mission essential resource limitations ## 4 4 5 2 1 4
4 x 3 p Equipment End-of-Life ## 4 3 1 1 3
4 x 3 p Building Refurbishments ## 4 3 3 1 1 2
5 x 5 p Comm Systems End-of-Life ## 5 5 4 3 5 5
4 x 4 p Building Maintenance Shortfall ## 4 3 3 4 2 2
3 x 4 p Asbestos abatement ## 3 2 3 2 4 3
4 x 4 p Core Capability Threat ## 4 4 3 1 4
4 x 4 p Water System-Repairs/Upgrades ## 4 4 4 4 2 3
5 x 4 r Research equipment failure threat ## 5 4 4 4
Legend
p Top Center Risk (TCR)
r Proposed Top Center Risk (Proposed TCR)
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• PRA integrates models based on 
systems engineering, probability and 
statistics, reliability and maintainability 
engineering, physical and biological 
sciences, decision theory, and expert 
opinion. 
• PRA is needed when decisions need to 
be made that involve high stakes in a 
complex situation.
• The collection of risk scenarios allows 
the dominant risk factors to be 
identified, then modified or eliminated 
to improve the probability of success.
Representing the World via Bayesian Inference.
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)
February 8, 2017 David T. Loyd
• In the PRA context, HRA is the assessment of the reliability and risk impact of 
the interactions of humans on a system or a function. 
• For situations that involve a large number of human-system interactions, HRA 
becomes an important element of PRA to ensure a realistic assessment of the 
risk.
• In general, the Human Reliability Analysis process has a number of distinct 
steps, as shown below:
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Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) Integration 
with Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)
Problem 
Definition
•Select initiating 
activity based on 
consequence 
assessment.
Task Analysis
•Identification of 
specific human 
motions, behaviors, 
actions, and 
dependent 
environments.
Error 
Representation 
(Modeling)
•Error options and 
probabilities are 
modeled and can be 
iteratively modified 
based on system 
design, procedures or 
risk control 
adjustments.
Quantification 
and Integration 
into PRA
•Determine overall 
probability of 
consequence.
Adapted from NASA/SP-2011-3421, Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and Practitioners
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Performance Shaping Factors (PSF)
Performance 
Shaping 
Factors
Organizational
Physical
EmotionalEnvironmental
Emergency 
Environment
• PSFs impact human 
performance in a variety of 
ways, such as intelligence, 
expertise, emotion, harsh 
conditions, conflicting orders, 
etc.
• PSFs are incorporated into HRA 
error modeling, accommodating 
anticipated human interaction 
with critical tasking.
• We work to minimize the affects 
of PSFs, but our expectation of 
performance must acknowledge 
their potential impact to 
operations.
Minimizing Human Error 
and Cultivating a Reduced Risk Environment 
Rasmussen’s 3 Human Responses to Operator Information Processing 
1. Skill-based: requires little or no cognitive effort.
2. Rule-based: driven by procedures or rules.
3. Knowledge-based: requires problem solving/decision making.
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“The fewer rules a coach has, the fewer 
rules there are for players to break.”
John Madden 
“Successful design is not the 
achievement of perfection but the 
minimization and accommodation of 
imperfection.” 
Henry Petroski
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• Trust is what drives open reporting. 
• Transparent dialog promotes availability of information to 
inform more robust decision-making.
• The result is uniform engagement to optimize success 
potential and accept a common risk tolerance (resilience). 
• This environment is the foundation of an effective safety 
culture 
16
Trust and Transparency Builds Common Risk Tolerance
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How Safety Culture Promotes Operational Excellence
• By advocating a pervasive Safety Culture, we can 
provide our workforce with:
– Clear emphasis on continuous learning;
– Encouragement to develop intuitive personal values;
– Guidelines for decision-making behavior that focuses on 
long-term success;
– Reinforcement to build trust by reporting and 
communicating concerns and ideas.
• Practicing an effective Safety Culture: 
– Builds Skill-based and Knowledge-based response 
mechanisms;
– Reduces the emphasis on Rule-based response; 
– And breaks down barriers to Trust. 
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NASA’s Safety/Risk Culture Model
18
“An environment characterized by safe attitudes and 
behaviors modeled by leaders and embraced by all that 
fosters an atmosphere of open communication, mutual 
trust, shared safety values and lessons, and confidence 
that we will balance challenges and risks consistent with 
our core value of safety to successfully accomplish our 
mission.”
An effective safety culture is characterized by the following 
subcomponents:
Culture - We report our concerns
Culture - We have a sense of fairness
Culture - We change to meet new demands
Culture - We learn from our successes and mistakes
Culture - Everyone does his or her part 
January 25, 2017
Catastrophic Event Impact
Using the Safety Culture Model to Analyze NASA’s History
Apollo 1 – January 27, 1967
Reporting Culture – Procedures were subjected to 
last-minute changes that were not effectively 
tracked, recorded or communicated.
Just Culture – Poor morale and process discipline 
were evident in Command Module contractor 
performance prior to the incident.
Flexible Culture – Willingness to change course on 
design issues was weak in the presence of 
compelling important information.
Learning Culture – Test planning failed to 
appreciate the significant hazards of a 100% 
oxygen environment.
Engaged Culture – NASA provided insufficient 
surveillance over management functions.
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Catastrophic Event Impact
Using the Safety Culture Model to Analyze NASA’s History
Apollo 13 – April 13, 1970
Reporting – Incomplete and sometimes incorrect 
information was used in problem solving.
Just – Absence of information on this factor attests 
to the general neglect at the time of organizational 
behavior as a key factor in mishaps.
Flexible – Demonstrated ability to adapt quickly to 
an emergency although flexibility prior to the 
mishap is unclear.
Learning – While safeguards had been implemented 
following the Apollo 1 fire, key aspects of design, 
workmanship, and material use remained 
vulnerable to oxygen flammability.
Engaged – Solutions immediately following the 
oxygen tank explosion represent an engaged team. 
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Catastrophic Event Impact
Using the Safety Culture Model to Analyze NASA’s History
Challenger – January 28, 1986
Reporting – Ineffective problem reporting 
requirements and practices.
Just – Stifled communication regarding O-ring 
susceptibility to cold conditions. 
Flexible – Launch concerns were dismissed in 
the face of significant schedule pressure.
Learning – Trend analysis was inadequate as 
evidenced by identification of a number of 
burn-through events which occurred prior 
to STS-51L.
Engaged – NASA management lacked 
involvement in critical discussions. 
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Catastrophic Event Impact
Using the Safety Culture Model to Analyze NASA’s History
Columbia – February 1, 2003
Reporting – Foam shedding was a known problem, yet foam impact data was still 
being analyzed at the time of the flight, and not considered a serious hazard.
Just – Some engineers were reluctant to raise concerns when faced with a return of 
an “in God we trust - all others bring data” attitude.  
Flexible – Like the Challenger mishap, the Shuttle Program was experiencing 
schedule pressure challenges. 
Learning – With “normalization of deviance,” foam had become classified as “in-
family” and as a negligible risk to the orbiter.
Engaged – “Echos” of the Challenger mishap were evident.
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Deepwater Horizon – April 20, 2010
Reporting – Procedures were subjected to last-minute 
distribution, last minute decision.
Just – Concerns of rig workers regarding test results 
were muted, not heeded or explored .
Flexible – All involved seemed prepared to exercise 
flexibility, but this may be indicative of insufficient 
process discipline.
Learning – Invalid confidence in new slurry, vents from 
Mud-Gas Separator (MGS) allowed gas to enter rig 
spaces, insufficient planning for contingencies.
Engaged – Incorrect reading of pressure tests, lack of 
recognition or timely control action related to kicks, 
diverted flow through MGS instead of overboard,  
reluctance to activate Blow-Out Preventer (BOP), 
reluctance to activate the Emergency Disconnect 
System, BOP testing and maintenance.
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NASA Safety Culture Model Applied to Deepwater Horizon
Measuring Safety Culture
David T. Loyd
2015 Safety Culture Survey Results
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HOT
“Eliminate the recalcitrant 
dinosaur dictators”
WARM
“Emphasis on purpose of 
safety measures, not just 
filling out a form or 
checking a box.”
TEPID
“Watch out for everyone” 
“Communication”
COOL
“Keep doing what you 
are doing. We are 
constantly being 
reminded of Safety and 
its importance.”
Comment Temperature Perspectives
The Path to Operational Excellence
• NASA, like the other hazardous industries, 
has suffered very catastrophic losses.
• Human error will likely never be completely 
eliminated as a factor in our failures.
• Acknowledging human frailty and the 
potential for failure bolsters our ability to 
manage risks and mitigate the worst 
consequences.
• Building an effective Safety Culture bolsters 
skill-based performance that minimizes risk 
and encourages operational excellence. 
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Columbia STS-107, February 1, 2003:
7 fatalities; 
$3 Billion vehicle loss;
2.5 year mission impact. 
Kalpana Chawla
Rick D. Husband
Laurel B. Clark
Ilan Ramon
Michael P. Anderson
David M. Brown
William C. McCool
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NOAA N-Prime, September 6, 2003:
• $135 Million vehicle damage;
• 5.5 year mission impact. February 8, 2017 David T. Loyd
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Genesis,  September 8, 2004:
• Some sample retrieval materials lost.
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Orbiting Carbon Observatory, 
February  24, 2009:
• $280 Million vehicle loss;
• 5+ year mission impact. 
Glory,  March 4, 2011:
• $424 Million vehicle loss;
• ??? mission impact. 
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JSC Chamber B Asphyxiation,
July 28, 2010
• Shoulder injury due to 
asphyxiation and fall.
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